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Abstract: This theoretical paper explores the affect-logic approach to schizophrenia in light of the
general complexity theories of cognition: embodied cognition, Haken’s synergetics, and Friston’s
free energy principle. According to affect-logic, the mental apparatus is an embodied system open to
its environment, driven by bioenergetic inputs of emotions. Emotions are rooted in goal-directed
embodied states selected by evolutionary pressure for coping with specific situations such as fight,
flight, attachment, and others. According to synergetics, nonlinear bifurcations and the emergence of
new global patterns occur in open systems when control parameters reach a critical level. Applied
to the emergence of psychotic states, synergetics and the proposed energetic understanding of
emotions lead to the hypothesis that critical levels of emotional tension may be responsible for the
transition from normal to psychotic modes of functioning in vulnerable individuals. In addition, the
free energy principle through learning suggests that psychotic symptoms correspond to alternative
modes of minimizing free energy, which then entails distorted perceptions of the body, self, and
reality. This synthetic formulation has implications for novel therapeutic and preventive strategies in
the treatment of psychoses, among these are milieu-therapeutic approaches of the Soteria type that
focus on a sustained reduction of emotional tension and phenomenologically oriented methods for
improving the perception of body, self, and reality.
Keywords: schizophrenia; phase transition; emotions; embodiment; self-organization
1. Introduction
During recent decades, several comprehensive theoretical accounts have emerged
that are potentially relevant for a better understanding of schizophrenia, among them
are the concepts of affect-logic [1–3], embodiment [4], synergetics [5,6], and the free en-
ergy principle [7]. These theories were developed largely independent of each other and
remained only loosely connected in spite of interesting commonalities. The goal of the
present paper is to explore shared features of these four concepts by focusing on common
or complementary elements with the hope of identifying novel therapeutic approaches to
schizophrenia.
Affect-logic is a comprehensive metatheory of cognition that focuses on the interac-
tions between emotions (affectivity) and cognition (logic). Affect-logic is rooted in psy-
chology, psychiatry, neurobiology, and evolutionary theory, adopting a systems-theoretical
perspective, including the theory of nonlinear dynamics in complex open systems. The
original German term, Affektlogik, points to omnipresent circular interactions between
emotion and cognition, where affect (Latin afficere, i.e., “arousing”, “attuning”) is un-
derstood as a global bioenergetic and psychophysical state of varying quality, duration,
and degree of awareness. Here, affect is an umbrella term that comprises all variants of
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overlapping emotion-near phenomena such as feelings, sensations, or moods. Affective
and cognitive elements interact in all mental processes, where processes seemingly charac-
terized by neutrality or indifference are likewise affective states in the sense mentioned.
Simultaneously active emotions, cognitions, and behaviors are memorized as integrated
“programs” for feeling, thinking, and behaving (FTB-programs). FTB-programs are learned
schemas that form the essential building blocks of the psyche and are reactivated in similar
situations. Conscious and unconscious emotions related to past or present experiences
guide and connect all cognitive functions, such as perception, attention, memory, thought,
and decision-making. In this, affect-logic concurs with Damasio’s somatic marker hypothe-
sis that cognitive decisions are guided by emotions [8]. Emotions have focusing, selecting,
and filtering “operator effects” on cognition. They tend to focus on cognitions with sim-
ilar emotional tuning and to ignore cognitions with dissimilar tuning. Initially intense
conscious emotions related to new, exciting, difficult, or potentially dangerous situations
gradually become automated and largely unconscious yet may still continue to exert their
operator effects on cognition, including in seemingly non-emotional situations. This is
true even in scientific or mathematical activities, where initially intense “eureka-feelings”,
which have accompanied a new discovery or solution, may gradually turn into easy-going
“highways” for semi-automatized mental operations.
One aspect of emotion is, as we will see below, of particular importance for the dy-
namics of psychosis: their energetic aspect. Emotional phenomena are rooted in embodied
bioenergetic states, which drive and motivate, sometimes also block and freeze, all motor
and cognitive behaviors. These states were selected by evolution to cope adequately with
situations relevant to survival, such as exploration, fight, flight, attachment, or loss, which
are eventually experienced as curiosity, rage, fear, pleasure, or mourning [9]. The notion of
“energy” is not just a metaphor but corresponds to the measurable allocation of energy in
the form of sympathetic/parasympathetic activations of the organism in specific situations.
In terms of systems theory, emotional energies provide the dynamics (the “fuel”), whereas
cognitive distinctions provide the structure (the “channels”) for all kinds of mental and
social systems and activities.
The concept of affect-logic postulates, furthermore, that affective-cognitive interac-
tions have a scale-free (so-called fractal or self-similar) architecture, as they are formally
similar on individual, microsocial, and macrosocial levels [10]. The levels interact through
structural coupling [11]. Self-similar selecting and filtering operator effects of emotions on
attention, perception, memory, and thought act on various individual or collective levels
(Figure 1), in local and short-term as well as in extended and long-lasting mental and social
processes [12,13].
The affect-logic approach was developed and elaborated to serve as a metatheoretical
background, especially for a better understanding of the outbreak of psychosis in the
context of schizophrenia spectrum disorder. In the present theoretical overview, we wish
to compare the affect-logic approach with further theoretical ‘approaches’ in the sense of
encompassing theories and paradigms of cognition. We focused on systems approaches that
aim at modelling the temporal dynamics of mental processes as a complex system. Three
general dynamical-systems approaches were identified: embodied cognition (recently
extended to 4E cognition: [14]), Haken’s synergetics, and Friston’s free energy principle.
These theories, described in the following, have remained only loosely connected with
each other in spite of apparent commonalities. In the following, we will explore their
commonalities to derive implications and novel perspectives for the modelling of psychosis
in schizophrenia-spectrum disorder and arrive at inspirations for treatment.




Figure 1. Affect-logic: cognition and emotion interact in a circular way on individual, microsocial, 
and macrosocial levels. Levels are linked by structural coupling. Cognitions provide the structure, 
whereas emotions provide the dynamics (energy, motivation) of complex mental and social sys-
tems. 
The affect-logic approach was developed and elaborated to serve as a metatheoretical 
background, especially for a better understanding of the outbreak of psychosis in the con-
text of schizophrenia spectrum disorder. In the present theoretical overview, we wish to 
compare the affect-logic approach with further theoretical ‘approaches’ in the sense of 
encompassing theories and paradigms of cognition. We focused on systems approaches 
that aim at modelling the temporal dynamics of mental processes as a complex system. 
Three general dynamical-systems approaches were identified: embodied cognition (re-
cently extended to 4E cognition: [14]), Haken’s synergetics, and Friston’s free energy prin-
ciple. These theories, described in the following, have remained only loosely connected 
with each other in spite of apparent commonalities. In the following, we will explore their 
commonalities to derive implications and novel perspectives for the modelling of psycho-
sis in schizophrenia-spectrum disorder and arrive at inspirations for treatment. 
2. Embodied Cognition 
The core tenet of embodiment is that mental processes, including feelings and 
thoughts, are anchored in the body, whether through the release of hormones, neural ac-
tivity, or through behaviors (”body language”). In the process of communication between 
two (or more) persons, non-verbal synchronies occur regularly, as for example in the un-
conscious mimicry of gestures, postures, tone of voice, and facial expressions of people 
we interact with. Interacting individuals also tend to synchronize their physiological pro-
cesses, such as skin conductance, respiration, or heart rate [15]. A characteristic of embod-
iment is bidirectionality, which emphasizes that the connections between mind and body 
go in both directions (Figure 2). In terms of the broad concept of 4E cognition, we focus 
here on just 2 E’s, Embodied and Enactive. Enactivism [16] encompasses mind, body and 
the environment; cognition is to be understood as the active continuous interplay between 
sensory perception (“environment”), the contingent adaptation of motor behavior 
(”body”), and cognitive models of the environment (“mind”). This is symbolized by the 
upper loop in Figure 2. Such enactive sensory-motor loops are the basis of phenomena of 
nonverbal synchrony in social interaction and psychotherapy, specifically [17]. 
An example for the Embodied loop is as follows: We smile when we feel joy, but joy 
can also be induced by the activation of smile-related facial muscles under a pretext. In 

































Figure 1. Affect-logic: cognition and emotion interact in a circular way on individual, microsocial,
and acrosocial levels. Levels are linked by structural coupling. Cognitions provide the structure,
hereas r i e the dynamics (energy, motivation) of complex mental and social systems.
2. Embodied Cognition
The core enet of embodiment is that m nt l processes, including feelings and thoughts,
are anchored in the body, whe her through the release of hormones, neural activity, or
through behaviors (“body language”). In the proc s of communication between two (or
more) persons, non-verbal synchronies occur regularly, as for example in the unconscious
mimicry of gestures, postures, tone of voice, and facial expressions of people we interact
with. Interacting individuals also tend to synchronize their physiological processes, such
as skin conductance, respiration, or heart rate [15]. A characteristic of embodiment is
bidirectionality, which emphasizes that the connections between mind and body go in
both directions (Figure 2). In terms of the broad concept of 4E cognition, we focus here
on just 2 E’s, Embodied and Enactive. Enactivism [16] encompasses mind, body and the
environment; cognition is to be understood as the active continuous interplay between
sensory perception (“environment”), the contingent adaptation of motor behavior (“body”),
and cognitive models of the environment (“mind”). This is symbolized by the upper loop
in Figure 2. Such enactive sensory-motor loops are the basis of phenomena of nonverbal
synchrony in social interaction and psychotherapy, specifically [17].
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An example for the Embodied loop is as follows: We smile when we feel joy, but joy
can also be induced by the activation of smile-related facial muscles under a pretext. In
the first case, the emotion is expressed in the body, while in the second the body expresses
itself, so to speak, in the perceived emotion. For instance, the manipulation of the motor
system by a “depressive” or “happy” gait on a conveyor belt correspondingly changes
mental processes and influences the memory of previously learned words. Depressive
walkers were found to show a bias in favor of recalling words with negative emotional
content [18].
In schizophrenia, sensorimotor and physiological synchronizations are often deficient
or completely absent [19]. This phenomenon, called disembodiment, may also be the source
of a number of disordered bodily sensations commonly observed in schizophrenia. Such
symptoms have been extensively described as so-called basic schizophrenic disorders by
Süllwold [20] and Huber [21]. According to current phenomenological research, many of
these disturbing body sensations may be at the origin of the distorted perception of reality
and self [22–24]. Other mainly somatic manifestations of psychosis, such as catatonia,
psychomotor agitation, or mutism-negativism, are closely related to the phenomenon of
disembodiment.
The concepts and fields of embodiment/disembodiment and affect-logic are largely
overlapping. The first and main reason for their correspondence is that, according to
affect-logic, all emotional phenomena are somatically rooted and thus embodied. Secondly,
the synchronies studied by embodiment research are crucial for the emergence of emo-
tional contagion [25] and, hence, for the mentioned self-similar effects of emotions at the
microsocial and macrosocial levels as proposed by affect-logic.
3. Synergetics
The concepts that underwrite synergetics were developed in the context of the
dynamics of complex open systems (or complexity theory) by the physicist Hermann
Haken [5,6,26]. Synergetics is an interdisciplinary theory that models processes and mecha-
nisms of pattern formation in physical and chemical, but also biological, mental, and social
systems. Spontaneous pattern formation through self-organization depends on a system
being driven by external energy sources (hence “open” system). The pattern that arises has
dynamical stability and thus can be described as an “attractor”. A core phenomenon of
synergetics is that sudden nonlinear bifurcations from one global pattern of functioning
into another, corresponding to a transition from one basin of attraction to another, occur in
complex systems of different kinds when the input of energy to the system reaches a critical
level [27,28]; for visual illustrations [29]. In the terminology of synergetics, the energy input
acts as a control parameter that determines the moment of bifurcation. The new pattern of
functioning is shaped by a new so-called order parameter (or “nucleus of crystallization”)
around which the new functional dynamic is organized. This order parameter is often a
formerly peripheral structural element that suddenly becomes dominant and “enslaves”
the dynamics of the whole system (Figure 3). An example from physics is the sudden
transition of a random mixture of light waves into a highly ordered laser beam at a certain
critical threshold of the energy supply.
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Figure 3. Synergetics: the complex patterns of self-organizing systems, symbolized by disordered
wave lines, are synchronized, and coordinated by structural elements, the order parameters. These
patterns can be disturbed and globally altered by critically increasing energetic tensions, when the
input of energy (=control para eter) reaches a critical level.
Examples from the biological domain include the change of a horse’s gait from trot to
gallop (both are attractors of movement coordination) under increasing energetic stimu-
lation. In the psychosocial context, it is a common observation that critically increasing
emotional tensions can provoke sudden shifts between one global pattern of feeling, think-
ing, and behaving into another. Thus, an initially merely verbal argument may turn into
a raging brawl, a diffuse fear into a collective panic, a festering conflict into open war-
fare. Tschacher and Haken [30] have also applied synergetic modelling approaches to
psychotherapy, distinguishing between different types of intervention in the framework
of the Fokker–Planck equation (FPE). The FPE defines the change of the probability of a
state variable x depending on time t. In the simplest case, x(t) is represented by Gaussian
normal distribution. The probability of this distribution can be changed by a deterministic
“drift” term of the equation and a stochastic “diffusion” term, hence by causation and/or
chance: “change = causation + chance”. Causation can shift the location of the Gaussian
distribution, whereas the stochastic diffusion term of the FPE (chance) can be expressed
by changing the variance of the Gaussian. The FPE combines both dynamics and thus
integrates causation with chance in a change model.
Considering the energetic properties of emotions under affect theory, we hypothesize
that such bifurcations are also at work during the emergence of psychotic symptomatology.
Emotional tensions can overburden a vulnerable coping system and enforce a transition
from normal patterns of feeling, thinking, and behaving into psychotic patterns. The level
of emotional tension is the relevant control parameter here. This tension can turn a formerly
marginal structural element, such as a vague suspicion or odd behavior, into the new order
parameter around which a psychotic pattern (e.g., a structured system of persecutory
delusions) emerges. This hypothesis is supported both by classical clinical observations
during psychotic breaks [31,32] and by the research on so-called high-expressed emotions,
which has shown significant associations between the outbreak of psychosis and excessive
emotional tensions in and around individuals at risk [33,34]. Emotional tensions related
to traumatic experiences such as sexual abuse, migration, painful separations, or other
unfavorable life events, can contribute to the progressive destabilization of a genetically
vulnerable “premorbid terrain” [1,3]. In addition, they also play a crucial role in the
occurrence of acute relapses during chronic long-term evolution dominated by negative
symptoms [35,36].
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4. Free Energy Principle
The free-energy principle was proposed by the neuroscientist Karl Friston. He postu-
lated that self-organizing biological systems have the fundamental tendency of continually
striving for an equilibrated energy flow with minimal losses of free energy in the service
of autopoiesis [7]. In terms of systems theory, this corresponds to the minimum of the
potential of an attractor, and in everyday language to the smoothest possible functioning
without unpleasant surprises (where surprises can be read as states that are not part of
the attracting set). Not only the single neuron but also the brain and the organism as
a whole are understood as devices for improving predictions regarding the behavior of
their respective environment. Mathematically, the free energy in question here stands
in as an upper boundary on the likelihood of states a particular system encounters and
plays the role of a potential function. Or in everyday language: free energy arises when
the predictions made by the system are wrong. However, unlike thermodynamic free
energy that is related to heat, the free energy in question here is a function of sensations
and (Bayesian) beliefs about the causes of those sensations. Free energy minimization in
biological systems operates by improving the prediction of environmental reactions on the
basis of experience (Figure 4). It can then be construed as “active inference”, in which both
action and perception try to minimize “surprise” (also known as a prediction error). This
is equivalent to maximizing the marginal likelihood (i.e., the goodness of fit) of sensory
inputs (also known as model evidence) under a generative model that is embodied by the
system in question. In this setting, a prediction (i.e., generative model) generates predicted
sensory consequences from inferred causes (i.e., model evidence).




Figure 4. Free energy principle: biological systems continuously work on the discrepancies between 
predictions and perceptions, corresponding to free energy. Thus, minimizing free energy optimizes 
their fit with the environment, reducing surprise and uncertainty. 
Friston’s ideas have predecessors in the reafference principle [39] and are also remi-
niscent of the interplay between assimilation and accommodation during cognitive devel-
opment described by Jean Piaget [40]. Konrad Lorenz similarly postulated that every de-
velopment of life is in itself equivalent to an accumulation of knowledge about the sur-
rounding world [41]. The free energy principle shares the fundaments of affect-logic, em-
bodiment, and synergetic formulations: For example, all rest upon a circular causality that 
lies at the heart of synergetics. In the case of the free energy principle, it is minimizing 
surprise or prediction errors to attune an individual’s implicit model of the world (the 
generative model) with the embodied world that supplies the sensory evidence for that 
model. The free energy principle is quintessentially “embodied” in the sense that the gen-
erative model is embodied or entailed by both the brain and body. Mathematically, the 
free energy formulation rests upon the solution to the Fokker–Planck equation and on the 
very existence of a random dynamical attractor, where ”random” pertains to the stochas-
tic term of the equation and ”attractor” to its deterministic term. This attractor is consti-
tuted by states which the organism is actively striving to attain in the context of exogenous 
(deterministic) forces and (random) fluctuations that endow nonequilibrium steady states 
with the dynamical itinerancy evinced by bifurcations and phase transitions. Finally, the 
existential imperative of minimizing surprise and uncertainty speaks directly to the affec-
tive nature of self-organized, autopoietic behavior and the dynamic role of excessive emo-
tional tensions featured in affect-logic theory. 
Friston’s concepts complete and deepen the approaches of affect-logic and synerget-
ics in an interesting way. They suggest, in particular, that the anxiety, insecurity, and crit-
ical emotional tension, which usually precede the outbreak of psychosis, may represent a 
clinical manifestation of increased free energy (i.e., ego-dystonic unpredictability and un-
certainty). The production and perception of psychotic symptoms such as delusions, hal-
lucinations, catatonia etc. may thus correspond to attempts of the mental apparatus to 
control and minimize free energy through the creation of an “alternative reality” in the 
service of autopoiesis. This interpretation is supported by clinical observations, which 
show that the emergence of a coherent system of delusions, or of negative psychotic symp-
toms such as indifference and social isolation, is often accompanied by a decrease of overt 
emotional tension and anxiety [31,32]. The inference aspect of active inference manifests 
clearly in this reading of the free energy principle in terms of false inference: namely, in-
ferring things are there when they are not (e.g., hallucinations and delusions) or inferring 
Figure 4. Free energy principle: biological systems continuously work on the discrepancies between
predictions and perceptions, corresponding to free energy. Thus, minimizing free energy optimizes
their fit with the environment, reducing surprise and uncertainty.
Improved predictions are achieved by actively adapting the implicit model of the real
world through structural and functional changes—from fast changes in neuronal activity
through to the slow growth of new connections in the neuronal network—and through
acting on the environment itself (e.g., by simply moving one’s eyes, or by moving one’s
entire body to a more appropriate environment). Any movement changes both what is
perceived and what can be predicted, thus influencing the generative models and the model
evidence with the goal of improving adaptation to the environment. Expressed in statistical
terms, the organism strives to maximize the likelihood of its continuous modelling loops so
as to minimize free energy. According to Friston, the minimization of free energy underlies
many biological phenomena. A striking example is the emergence of rhythmic oscillations
in the brain known as alpha, beta, and gamma rhythms in the EEG [37,38]. All learning
processes, too, can be cast as the minimization of free energy.
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Friston’s ideas have predecessors in the reafference principle [39] and are also rem-
iniscent of the interplay between assimilation and accommodation during cognitive de-
velopment described by Jean Piaget [40]. Konrad Lorenz similarly postulated that every
development of life is in itself equivalent to an accumulation of knowledge about the
surrounding world [41]. The free energy principle shares the fundaments of affect-logic,
embodiment, and synergetic formulations: For example, all rest upon a circular causality
that lies at the heart of synergetics. In the case of the free energy principle, it is minimizing
surprise or prediction errors to attune an individual’s implicit model of the world (the
generative model) with the embodied world that supplies the sensory evidence for that
model. The free energy principle is quintessentially “embodied” in the sense that the
generative model is embodied or entailed by both the brain and body. Mathematically,
the free energy formulation rests upon the solution to the Fokker–Planck equation and
on the very existence of a random dynamical attractor, where “random” pertains to the
stochastic term of the equation and “attractor” to its deterministic term. This attractor
is constituted by states which the organism is actively striving to attain in the context of
exogenous (deterministic) forces and (random) fluctuations that endow nonequilibrium
steady states with the dynamical itinerancy evinced by bifurcations and phase transitions.
Finally, the existential imperative of minimizing surprise and uncertainty speaks directly
to the affective nature of self-organized, autopoietic behavior and the dynamic role of
excessive emotional tensions featured in affect-logic theory.
Friston’s concepts complete and deepen the approaches of affect-logic and synergetics
in an interesting way. They suggest, in particular, that the anxiety, insecurity, and critical
emotional tension, which usually precede the outbreak of psychosis, may represent a
clinical manifestation of increased free energy (i.e., ego-dystonic unpredictability and
uncertainty). The production and perception of psychotic symptoms such as delusions,
hallucinations, catatonia etc. may thus correspond to attempts of the mental apparatus to
control and minimize free energy through the creation of an “alternative reality” in the
service of autopoiesis. This interpretation is supported by clinical observations, which
show that the emergence of a coherent system of delusions, or of negative psychotic
symptoms such as indifference and social isolation, is often accompanied by a decrease
of overt emotional tension and anxiety [31,32]. The inference aspect of active inference
manifests clearly in this reading of the free energy principle in terms of false inference:
namely, inferring things are there when they are not (e.g., hallucinations and delusions) or
inferring things are not there when they are (e.g., dissociative symptoms, derealization,
depersonalization).
Tschacher, Giersch, and Friston [19] assume that psychotic interpretations of reality
are based on erroneous predictions possibly related to disturbed perceptions of the en-
vironment and, in particular, the embodied self. Erroneous predictions may also be the
consequence and, simultaneously, the cause of the “loss of normal self-evidence” and
disembodiment emphasized by phenomenologists such as Blankenburg and Fuchs. The
blurred boundaries between self and others focused on by psychoanalysts [42] point in
the same direction. Similarly, unfamiliar environments and conflicting or contradictory
life experiences (“double-binds”), which were found to be related to the outbreak of psy-
chosis [43,44], may contribute to false inferences and ensuing (erroneous) predictions.
5. Discussion: Towards a Translational Understanding of Psychosis
A translational, that is to say, multi-conceptual, understanding of schizophrenia arises
on the basis of the above, and this translational view can be integrated into the generally
accepted vulnerability–stress model of psychiatry, which postulates that acute psychotic
symptoms can arise in both genetically and/or biographically vulnerable individuals
when emotional tensions induced by stress—surprise or uncertainty—reach a critical
level [1,45–47]. These tensions correspond to a clinical manifestation of unbound free
energy, which is eventually minimized by a nonlinear phase transition from normal to
psychotic patterns of feeling, thinking, and behaving.
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In synergetics and the free energy approach, the dynamics of phase transitions is
viewed as the process of moving through bifurcations. In other words, the currently active
attractor becomes unstable and increasingly weakened before the critical point of the
control parameter or free energy is reached [6]. The signature of this destabilization of the
old pattern/attractor is called critical slowing down, which can be observed empirically as
the system needs more time to relax into its attractor after some perturbation. At the exact
point of bifurcation, the system “chooses” between two (new) quasi-attractors, which choice
often occurs through a chance event. This means, however, that exactly this period in the
development of the system is most accessible for (even small) deterministic interventions
that can guide the trajectory into the preferred specific attractor.
This innovative view has the advantage of not only integrating the four theoretical
approaches in question. It also better explains the enormous variability of long-term out-
comes revealed by follow-up studies over several decades [48–51]. Furthermore, psychotic
symptoms such as delusions, hallucinations, emotional indifference, and social withdrawal
do not appear, in this light, merely as deficits in the sense of the standard medical model
but also as active and productive coping strategies. Symptoms are thus understood as
instrumental in the service of free energy minimization and autopoiesis, as symptoms
decrease the critical emotional tensions. Over time, these defensive mechanisms may
become ingrained, habitual, and hard-wired by neural plasticity—thus partly explain-
ing certain functional and structural modifications found in the brains of persons with
schizophrenia [52,53].
6. Therapeutic Implications
The proposed understanding of schizophrenia in the context of complexity science
has both therapeutic and preventive implications. We consider the following of particu-
lar interest:
We noted above that, according to complexity theory, the critical time of phase transi-
tions are particularly sensitive for interventions. The critical slowing down of a system, the
signature of being close to imminent bifurcation, is in principle clinically observable and
can thus inform about the optimal time for deterministic interventions towards desired
new cognition or behavior.
If excessive emotional tensions do indeed play the postulated key role at the onset of
psychosis, then systematically reducing emotional tensions in and around acute patients
should be a main therapeutic focus. Many elements of conventional medical interventions,
however, rather increase than decrease emotional tensions, among them the often chaotic
circumstances of hospitalization, the unfamiliar and opaque atmosphere of psychiatric
hospitals, size of wards, architecture, lack of staff continuity, overstimulation by excessive
noise, and sometimes also violence. Small, family-like, stimulus-protecting environments
should therefore be much more appropriate. In terms of the Fokker–Planck Equation
(FPE), such interventions relate to the stochastic term of the FPE. Stochastic interventions
can be implemented to protect existing patterns from random fluctuations by boundary
regulation [30].
This is realized in therapeutic environments of the Soteria type, which were first
created in the 1970s in California [54] and have been functioning successfully since 1984,
with some conceptual modifications, in the therapeutic community Soteria Bern in Switzer-
land [55,56]. An increasing number of similar institutions were recently founded across
Europe, especially in Germany. In this approach, sustained emotional relaxation is not
mainly obtained by neuroleptic medication, but rather by continual personal support, by
“being with” and “doing with” the psychotic patient, creating a trusting therapeutic alliance
between specially selected and trained caregivers and the patient. The Soteria milieu is
designed to ward off overtaxing external inputs when the patient initially lives in the “soft
room”, which corresponds to boundary regulation. Further ingredients of the treatment
philosophy are the systematic inclusion of the patient’s family or other important persons
of reference into the therapeutic process and participation in appropriately dosed every-
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day activities such as cooking, shopping, and housekeeping. According to comparative
empirical research, two-year results were obtained that are equivalent to, and subjectively
rather better than, standard treatment. Soteria-type environments use significantly fewer
neuroleptics and can partly also be run with lower costs [56–59].
A stable, transparent, and securing therapeutic environment of the Soteria type may
also improve patients’ predictions about the behavior of their environment and, thus,
reduce the need for “crazy” alternative explanations. According to a recent pilot study
conducted by Soteria Konstanz (Germany), disturbed feelings of reality and self can be
significantly improved by flexibly integrating specific behavior–therapeutic elements into
everyday contacts and activities [60].
Similar goals are pursued by body-centered therapeutic methods recently proposed in
connection with the disembodiment in schizophrenia, such as interventions from dance
and movement therapy. These approaches emphasize the significance of sensorimotor
experience and body motion for cognition, affect, and social interaction and strive to
enhance emotional processing and self-regulation [61,62]. Such methods appear especially
effective for reducing negative symptoms such as passivity and social withdrawal [63].
Innovative therapeutic strategies may also be based on the previously mentioned
productivity of psychotic symptoms, e.g., by valorizing the creative aspects of the involved
emotional energies and eventually steering them towards more constructive directions.
An example is Milton Erickson’s imitating the incomprehensible artificial language of a
chronically psychotic patient and regularly “speaking” with him in this language until the
patient suddenly started to speak normally, gradually accepted a friendly relationship and
progressively normalized his behavior [64].
Finally, the multifocal understanding of psychosis proposed here strongly argues for
restructuring long-term psychotherapy. Conventional long-term neuroleptic medication is
not only unable to consolidate the underlying structural vulnerability of the patient but
is also burdened by severe long-term side effects. Among the many currently proposed
psychotherapeutic methods, the following two are particularly close to the proposed
understanding of psychosis: The approach practiced by the Swiss family therapist Ursula
Davatz, who describes psychosis as the result of an “emotional tsunami” in the family
system [65], and the integrative approach developed by the Italian therapist Giovanni
Ariano [66,67]. Since, as we believe, emotions do play a decisive role in the outbreak of
psychoses, it may also be worth considering interventions developed in psychotherapies
for other disorders, such as depression. For instance, it was found that emotion regulation
plays a role in depressive disorders, where some patients are emotionally over-regulated
whereas others are under-regulated. It is thus important to take the type of emotion
regulation into account in the choice of therapeutic strategies [68], which appears reasonable
also in psychotherapy with schizophrenia patients.
7. Open Questions
The synopsis of the concepts of affect-logic, embodiment, synergetics, and free energy
minimization appears capable of opening up new ways of understanding and also treating
schizophrenia. In this view, embodied emotions and emotional energies play a more
important role in the genesis and long-term evolution of schizophrenia than hitherto
admitted. Unbounded (“free”) emotional energies related to traumatic life experiences not
only contribute to further destabilizing a vulnerable “premorbid terrain” but are probably
also responsible both for the outbreak of acute psychotic decompensations, as well as for
acute relapses during long-term clinical progression characterized by negative symptoms.
This same view also stimulates a number of lingering open questions:
• Why do certain people react to critically rising emotional tensions with psychotic symp-
toms, whereas others respond with violence, fall into panic, or become depressed?
• Is there a specific schizophrenogenic vulnerability, and what does it consist of? It
was long suspected by the affect-logic perspective, with special reference to Eugen
Bleuler’s concept of “loose associations” (cf. disembodiment!), that there may be a
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partly genetically and partly biographically determined instability of the links between
feeling and thinking. Of particular importance are those links that regulate basic inter-
personal relations (in psychoanalytic terminology, the object representations). This
hypothesis is at least partly supported by recent neurobiological findings revealing
disturbed neuronal connections between frontal cortical and subcortical areas, the
amygdalae [69].
• Does the labilization of the psyche that is physically manifest in terms of functional
disconnections in the brain result as a direct consequence of aberrant (i.e., false)
learning and inference [70,71]?
• There is yet no direct quantitative evidence for the hypothesis that emotional tensions
can lead to a phase transition into psychosis, as is proposed by affect-logic. It would
be desirable to have objective physiological markers for emotional tension at hand.
• Why does the psychotic phenomenology differ so much from case to case that Eugen
Bleuler, the creator of the term schizophrenia in 1911, used to speak of “the group of
schizophrenias” [72]? Is this related to the changing influence of a great number of
environmental variables or to some genetic or other biological variables?
• As a final and perhaps most important, but to our knowledge astonishingly neglected,
question: How do both “spontaneous” and therapy-induced improvements and recov-
eries arise? According to long-term follow-up studies over several decades [48,50,73],
full and lasting recoveries comprise, in the long run, at least one fourth of cases and
may even amount to roughly two thirds under especially favorable conditions [51,74].
It is obvious that all these questions and hypotheses, while quite plausible in our eyes
and also consistent with a number of clinical observations and empirical findings, need
much more specification and confirmation—or rejection—by further research. The goal of
the present explorative (and perhaps provocative) overview was to stimulate such research.
8. Endnotes
1. The Fokker-Planck equation plays a central role in nearly all of physics. It describes
the evolution of the probability density of a system’s states when they are subject to random
fluctuations and deterministic impacts. Common variants of the Fokker-Planck equation
include the master equation for discrete systems and the Schrödinger wave equation in
quantum electrodynamics. It also manifests in theoretical biology as a model of population
density dynamics (e.g., the Wright-Fisher model). The solution of the Fokker-Planck
equation for any random dynamical system—in a nonequilibrium steady state—also forms
the basis of the free energy principle.
2. Mathematically on the background of the Fokker-Planck equation, uncertainty
can be read as an expected surprise. In information theory, surprise (or surprisal) corre-
sponds to self-information, while expected surprise or uncertainty is known as entropy.
Minimizing expected free energy by choosing appropriate actions can then be read as
reducing uncertainty in anticipation of familiar, unsurprising outcomes. From a physi-
cist’s perspective, this would look like self-organization to a nonequilibrium steady state.
From a psychiatrist’s perspective, this would look like an active search for synchrony and
predictability and the active avoidance of existential fear.
3. We use ‘unbound’ here deliberately to conflate Freudian notions of unbound energy
with the role of variational free energy as a bound on surprise or marginal likelihood [75].
Indeed, in machine learning, variational free energy is known as an evidence bound [76].
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